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Abstract
Growth of U.S. agriculture is dependent on increases in productivity, three-fourths of
which is accounted for by public investment in agricultural research and development
(R&D) and infrastructure, according to this research.  Productivity growth in U.S. agri-
culture benefits consumers by putting downward pressure on real primary and processed
food prices.  Moreover, maintaining export growth in international markets relies on rel-
ative productivity growth against major competitors.  Public investments in agricultural
R&D have stagnated since the mid-1970’s, raising questions about sustained productivi-
ty growth in U.S. agriculture.
Keywords: Agricultural growth, agricultural research and development, total factor pro-
ductivity growth, public investments, international trade negotiations.
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Productivity growth has been the dominant factor underlying U.S. agricultural growth
since at least the 1950's.  Without productivity growth, the agricultural sector would
have declined both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the economy.  The fact
that productivity growth has averaged more than double real price declines means that
the sector can continue to produce and profit in spite of declining prices.  Productivity
growth was much more important for agriculture than for the overall economy, where
more than 70 percent of growth was caused by additions of labor, capital, and material
inputs.  Because of the large number of producers and the dispersed nature of produc-
tion, public investments have been a very important source of productivity growth for
agriculture.  We estimate that public agricultural R&D and infrastructure accounted for
75 percent of the growth in agricultural productivity between 1949 and 1991.  
Productivity growth mostly benefits consumers by putting downward pressure on prima-
ry and processed food prices.  The food processing sector is linked to primary produc-
tion agriculture through the purchase of inputs.  Consumers have benefited not only
from the price declines of agricultural commodities, but also from the productivity
growth of the food processing sector.  The larger relative share of the consumer dollar
going to processors and marketing is due to increasing consumer demand for more
value-added from the food and fiber sector.  
High relative productivity growth of primary agriculture is also a major factor in main-
taining and fostering export growth and competitiveness of U.S. food and agricultural
products in international markets.  With the phasing down of commodity payments for
agriculture under the 1996 Farm Act, public support for agricultural R&D and rural
infrastructure becomes an increasingly important means to support agriculture in the
future.  However, although productivity growth remains high, public investments in
R&D have slackened in the 1990's, raising questions about sustained productivity
growth in the future. 
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The purpose of this report is to investigate the
sources of U.S. agricultural growth and their impor-
tance to the broader economy.  As the U.S. economy
has grown, the agricultural share of gross domestic
product (GDP) has fallen from 4 percent in 1959 to
1.4 percent in 1996, a pattern common to most devel-
oped countries.  The United States remains the
world’s largest agricultural exporter, accounting for
15 percent of global agricultural exports (Gehlhar
and Vollrath, 1996).  In addition, U.S. agricultural
trade recorded a surplus of $30 billion in 1996, con-
tributing 10 percent of the country’s total export
earnings.  Nevertheless, the returns to factors of pro-
duction in agriculture—such as farmland, family
labor, farm equipment and buildings—have grown
only 1 percent per year (on average) since 1959,
while the returns to labor and capital (GDP) at the
national level have grown at almost 3 percent
(Gopinath and Roe, 1995a).  
The U.S. agricultural sector has both maintained its
presence in international markets and  declined in
importance within the U.S. economy.  This raises
several questions about U.S. agriculture and its inter-
action with the broader economy.  What factors
account for the growth of U.S. agriculture?  How
does agricultural growth compare with other sectors
of the U.S. economy?  Does the growth of agriculture
benefit the broader economy and, in particular, the
food processing sector?  Can the United States con-
tinue to compete with European and other countries
in increasingly competitive world agricultural mar-
kets?
In what follows, we provide some background on
U.S. agriculture before proceeding to address each of
the above questions.  Productivity growth, or increas-
es in output per unit of input, is crucial for agricul-
ture.  Productivity growth is a broader concept than
partial productivity measures like labor productivity
or yields.  Increasing fertilizer (labor, land, machin-
ery) use can increase output but not necessarily out-
put per unit of input; as more of a particular input is
used, its contribution to additional output declines.
The level of output per unit of input is often referred
to as total factor productivity (TFP) or the level of
technology (Ahearn et al., 1998).  
Agricultural prices have been falling relative to the
prices of nonagricultural commodities.  This ratio (an
index of agricultural prices to an overall price index
for the goods and services produced in the U.S. econ-
omy such as the GDP deflator) we call the terms of
trade of agriculture.  
The returns to factors engaged in agricultural produc-
tion depend upon the growth in TFP within agricul-
ture and changes in agriculture’s terms of trade with
the rest of economy.  Since the late 1940’s, the rate
of growth in U.S. agricultural TFP has averaged
around 2 percent per year (Gopinath and Roe, 1995a;
Ahearn et al., 1998).  This rate of growth has driven
the growth in agricultural output (2.16 percent per
year), while at the same time preventing further
declines in returns to the factors of production.
Public investments in agricultural research and devel-
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reports.opment (R&D) and public infrastructure account for
75 percent of the growth in agricultural TFP.
However, the growth in public agricultural R&D has
declined from about 6 percent per year in the 1960’s
to under 2 percent per year in the 1990’s (Alston and
Pardey, 1996).  This raises concern about the future
growth of U.S. agriculture since, as other research
suggests (Ruttan, 1996), sustained investment in
R&D is required just to maintain current yields from
the coevolution of pests and pathogens. 
Although the total number of farms has declined,
farms with sales of more than $100,000 per year con-
tinue to grow in number and resource use (fig. 1).
This suggests that the commercial farm sector contin-
ues to grow and to account for increasing shares of
agricultural output (fig. 2).  However, employment in
the sector has declined relative to other sectors of the
economy.  The reduction in the number of farms is
associated with the decline in agriculture’s terms of
trade, which has offset, to a considerable degree, the
beneficial effects of TFP growth on agricultural GDP.
Agricultural TFP growth has stabilized since 1985
(Gopinath and Roe, 1995a), along with a decline in
the rate of growth in public investments in agricultur-
al R&D.  No historical evidence is available to sug-
gest that private sector investments in agricultural
R&D are alone sufficient to mitigate the negative
effects of price declines on the returns to resources
specific to agriculture.
Markets for many basic agricultural technologies
(such as research in plant breeding, plant pathology,
soil physics and chemistry, and animal nutrition) con-
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Figure 1
Farms below $100,000 decline while those above $100,000 increase
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994






1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
0












 $250,000tain a large public good component (Huffman and
Evenson, 1993; Alston and Pardey, 1996).  Thus,
returns realized by private R&D firms investing in
this type of research fall far short of the full contribu-
tion to productivity.  Consequently, private sector
firms tend to underinvest in these activities and rely
on the public sector for this type of basic research.
They then adopt and adapt the more basic research to
specific local and regional market conditions.
Productivity growth and public investments in agri-
cultural R&D have important implications for the
broader economy and, in particular, for the food pro-
cessing sector. U.S. agriculture provides primary
agricultural inputs to the food processing sector at
declining real prices (Gopinath, Roe, and Shane,
1996).  These lower prices, in turn, are passed on to
the rest of the economy in terms of moderately lower
real prices for processed foods.  This cost advantage
allows the processed foods sector to compete more
effectively for export shares in the growing world
markets for processed food.  Hence, growth in agri-
cultural productivity increases the returns to the fac-
tors engaged in agricultural production, while at the
same time these gains in efficiency are shared with
the rest of the economy.  This also suggests that
declines in the growth of public investment in agri-
cultural R&D may lead to reduced rates of growth in
the food processing sector and encourage increased
imports of processed foods.
Sources of Growth in the U.S.
Economy and Agriculture
We first examine the sources of growth in the overall
economy.  This analysis shows the evolution of the
major sectors of the U.S. economy, linkages among
them, and the relative importance of productivity
growth in agriculture and food processing. 
Our methodology—unlike traditional approaches that
use either production functions (Ball et al., 1996) or
value-added functions (Jorgenson et al., 1987)—uses
a GDP function to account for growth at the aggre-
gate as well as sectoral level.  In all these approach-
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Commercial farms are producing an
 increasing share of farm output
Percent of sales and farm numbers
Lower bound of farm size categories
Table 1—Components of U.S. real GDP growth, 1959-91
GDP             Price effect                        Labor               Capital              TFP
growth           Agricultural    Manufacturing        Services                                                           growth
Percent
1959-91 average 2.92 -0.03 -0.23 -0.35 1.18 1.18 0.40
% contribution (-1) (-8) (12) (41) (40) (16)
1959-62 3.00 0.00 -0.34 0.58 0.49 0.97 1.26
1963-67 4.77 -0.01 -0.09 0.22 2.02 1.64 0.92
1968-72 2.98 0.02 -0.31 0.39 0.88 1.45 0.53
1973-77 2.64 -0.02 0.17 -0.11 1.36 1.22 -0.01
1978-82 1.28 -0.06 0.05 0.14 0.98 1.28 -1.10
1983-87 3.85 -0.08 -0.64 0.75 1.74 1.00 1.03
1988-91 1.91 -0.04 -0.48 0.49 0.62 0.70 0.60es, productivity growth is measured as a Solow resid-
ual—the ratio of growth in an index of aggregate out-
put to growth in an index of aggregate input.
Ordinarily, productivity growth is the unexplained
part of the growth in the index of aggregate output.
However, our GDP function approach extends the
production function approach by taking into account
agriculture’s terms of trade with the rest of the econ-
omy and its competition with other sectors for econo-
mywide resources.
Sources of Growth in the U.S. Economy
Real growth in U.S. GDP averaged 2.92 percent per
year over 1959-91.  At this rate, it takes approximate-
ly 24 years to double the current level of GDP.
Increases in inputs, labor, and capital (accumulation)
have accounted for more than 80 percent of the
growth in real U.S. GDP, while productivity growth,
at 0.40 percent per year, accounts for only 16 percent
(table 1, Gopinath and Roe, 1996).   However, the
nature and magnitude of these effects have varied
substantially among sectors.
The growth of the services sector has benefited most
from favorable changes in relative prices (fig. 3),
while manufacturing, agriculture, and food process-
ing have suffered negative terms of trade.  These
varying fortunes did not affect the rate of growth in
overall U.S. GDP, because gains to one sector are
offset by losses to other sectors (Gopinath and Roe,
1996).  Nevertheless, changes in terms of trade had
large effects on sectoral outputs.  The increases in the
real price of services accounted for 56 percent of the
growth in the services sector share of GDP.  The
analysis also found evidence of some price comple-
mentarity between agriculture and manufacturing:  an
increase in the price of manufacturing leads to a
small increase in the supply of agricultural output.
This result is explained, in part, by agriculture’s
being a supplier of primary inputs to the manufactur-
ing sector.
While productivity in the overall U.S. economy has
been growing throughout the post-war period
(Gopinath and Roe, 1995b), the impact of productivi-
ty growth has not been uniform across all outputs.
The sectoral bias in productivity growth has favored
the production of services relative to manufacturing.
Our empirical results also suggest that technological
change has been biased toward augmenting the pro-
ductivity of labor relative to that of capital.  It is not
surprising that the bias in favor of the services sector
arises from growth in labor productivity because it is
a relatively labor-intensive sector.  Interestingly, no
bias was found for the case of agriculture, although
labor use declined at an average rate of 1.8 percent
per year since 1945.  At the aggregate level, the
effect of technology on agricultural output has been
neither positive nor negative; productivity growth
within the sector is just sufficient to overcome the
large bias of labor-using technological change that
benefited the services sector.  Thus, the growth of the
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Food processing and agriculture face most severe price declinesU.S. economy is characterized by an increase in the
share of resources allocated to the production of ser-
vices relative to agriculture and manufacturing (fig.
4). This has dampened the growth in returns to
resources specific to the agricultural sector, while
helping to increase returns to labor caused by the
growth of the service sector. 
Agricultural Growth 
Growth in real primary agricultural GDP derives
from changes in the level of real agricultural prices,
changes in the level of inputs, and growth in TFP.1
Increases in inputs and output prices typically
increase production, but do not necessarily increase
productivity.  As Krugman (1996b, p. 171) notes,
“productivity growth represents increases in output
per unit of input; such increases may result from bet-
ter management or better economic policy, but in the
long run are due to increases in knowledge,” as
embodied in new technologies and management
know-how.  However, the nature and magnitude of
all three effects—prices, inputs, and productivity—on
growth are important as each of them can be influ-
enced by public policy. 
Agricultural output growth averaged 2.16 percent per
year between 1959 and 1991, while real agricultural
GDP grew at only 0.97 percent per year (table 2,
Gopinath and Roe, 1995a).2 The difference (-1.19
percent) is explained by the decreasing real prices for
agricultural output.3 A decline in the level of total
inputs employed in agriculture also contributed to the
decline in the growth in its real GDP (-0.15 percent
per year).  Intermediate inputs, such as better seeds
and chemicals, contributed positively to growth (0.49
per cent per year), but this contribution was insuffi-
cient to overcome the effects caused by the exit of
labor (table 3, Gopinath and Roe, 1995a).  The con-
tribution from capital and land to growth was also
small. 
TFP growth is the major contributor to growth in
agricultural output and to the returns to its sector-
specific factors of production.  Growth in TFP aver-
aged 2.31 percent per year over 1959-91 (table 1,
Gopinath and Roe, 1995a); as estimated by ERS,
TFP growth in primary agriculture was 1.94 percent
for 1948-94 (Ahearn et al., 1998).  The difference is
largely due to our approach, which accounts for the









Factors contributing to changes in sectoral shares 
of GDP, 1948-92
1In this report, the terms “productivity” and “total factor productivity”
are used synonymously.
2 Agricultural output is measured by a quantity-based index with fixed
base-year prices, while real agricultural GDP is a value-based series of
agricultural GDP, taken from the national income accounts, divided by
the GDP price deflator.
3 There are several reasons for agriculture’s falling terms of trade.  In a
global context, productivity growth has led to supply shifts outpacing
demand, which has resulted in declining agricultural prices.  Low price
and income elasticity of demand for food may also lead to declining
prices.
Table 2—Components of U.S. agricultural real
GDP growth, 1959-91
Real
Agri. GDP    Real price      Input         TFP
growth         effect     contribution   growth*
Percent
1959-91
average 0.97 -1.19 -0.15 2.31
1959-63 0.14 -2.40 0.00 2.54
1964-68 0.39 -1.95 -0.69 3.03
1969-73 8.97 5.71 -0.19 3.45
1974-78 -2.73 -4.18 1.99 -0.54
1979-83 -4.56 -2.86 -1.45 -0.25
1984-88 0.78 -2.17 -1.21 4.16
1989-91 5.65 0.03 0.94 4.68
*The sum of TFP growth (2.31) and input contribution  (-.15) yields
the traditional output growth (2.16).effects of falling real prices for agricultural com-
modities.  At this rate of TFP growth, aggregate agri-
cultural output would double in about 30 years, hold-
ing all else constant.  Although TFP growth in the
last column of table 2 exhibits high variability, the
filtered TFP growth series suggests a stagnating trend
since 1980 (Gopinath and Roe, 1995a).4 If produc-
tivity had instead grown by only 1.34 percent, then
returns to resources specific to agriculture would
have remained constant over the period.5 Stagnant
returns would almost surely have encouraged more
resources to exit agriculture and flow into other sec-
tors of the economy.  Hence, productivity growth in
agriculture is crucial to sustaining the returns to its
sector-specific resources, given agriculture’s declin-
ing terms of trade with the rest of the economy. 
These aggregate effects of prices, inputs, and produc-
tivity on agricultural growth have concealed the re-
allocation of resources among subsectors (Gopinath
and Roe, 1995b).  While the outputs of grain, crop,6
and livestock outputs have all grown, the bias of pro-
ductivity growth has been toward grains and crops
relative to livestock (fig. 5).   Since grain production
is far less labor-intensive than livestock, rising real
wages caused by the growth of the services sector
places larger upward pressures on the cost of live-
stock production than on grain production.
Moreover, the higher rates of productivity growth in
the grain and crop subsectors have, at the margin,
helped them to pull resources from the livestock sec-
tors.  As the grain and crop subsectors are more
intensive in the use of intermediate inputs (fertilizers,
pesticides), they have also benefited from technologi-
cal change embodied in these inputs.
Growth in the Food Processing Sector
The growth in real GDP of the food processing sec-
tor, at 1.04 percent per year, averaged slightly more
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Table 3—Components of agricultural input growth, 1959-91
Hired          Family       Intermediate      Real            Capital       Aggregate
labor            labor            inputs         property                              input
Percent
1959-91 -0.14 -0.39 0.49 -0.08 -0.03 -0.15
1959-63 -0.06 -0.83 0.97 -0.04 -0.03 0.00
1964-68 -0.67 -0.61 0.47 -0.02 0.14 -0.69
1969-73 0.02 -0.39 0.03 0.05 0.09 -0.19
1974-78 0.05 -0.47 2.09 0.12 0.21 1.99
1979-83 -0.12 -0.25 -0.30 -0.61 -0.18 -1.45
1984-88 -0.06 -0.31 -0.51 -0.02 -0.33 -1.21
1989-91 -0.20 0.49 0.78 -0.02 -0.11 0.94
4 The filtering was done to capture the underlying growth component in
this series, which is devoid of fluctuations due to weather and related
shocks. See fig. 9 for the trend of filtered TFP growth.
5 1.34 percent represents the combined effects of declining real prices
and input use (1.19+0.15).















Output and productivity growth rates in
 agriculture, 1949-91
Percentthan that of primary agriculture over 1959-91 (table
4; Gopinath, Roe, and Shane, 1996).  Intermediate
inputs were the major contributors to the growth of
GDP in the food processing sector.  All else constant,
the contribution from all inputs to growth in its real
GDP averaged 1.46 percent per year, with intermedi-
ate inputs alone (which include primary agricultural
output) contributing 1.01 percent per year.  Growth in
total factor productivity averaged 0.41 percent per
year.  These two sources, together, yield an average
annual rate of growth in the sector’s output of about
1.87 percent.   However, like primary agriculture,
this sector too was subject to declining real prices
(0.83 percent per year).
Primary agriculture averaged about 26 percent of the
intermediate inputs used by the food processing sec-
tor over 1959-91.  It follows that approximately a
fourth of the growth in the food processing sector’s
GDP is attributable to the primary agricultural com-
ponent of intermediate inputs.  The drop in the pri-
mary agricultural price index of 1.19 percent per year
translates into a decline of 0.32 percent per year in
the total procurement costs of the food processing
sector.  Thus, productivity growth in primary agricul-
ture is passed on to the food processing sector
through reduced cost of primary inputs.  However,
prices for processed foods declined, on average, 0.83
percent per year.  The net decline (0.51 percent)
comes from within the sector and exceeds the rate of
productivity growth (0.41 percent) in food process-
ing.  Consequently, productivity growth of both pri-
mary agriculture and food processing are passed on
to consumers in the form of lower food prices.7
In contrast to primary agriculture, the contribution to
growth of the food processing sector from changes in
the level of inputs is relatively large.  Arnade and
Gopinath (1996) found that adjustment of the sector-
specific capital in agriculture and food processing to
changes in relative prices of output is slow because
employment opportunities outside of agriculture are
limited, particularly over short periods of time.
Thus, agricultural capital requires a long time before
adjusting to a change in market conditions.
However, the food processing and services sectors’
capital fully responds to any given change in external
factors within 5 years.  These observed differences in
capital adjustment rates are consistent with capital’s
contribution to sectoral growth.  In sectors like ser-
vices and food processing, capital’s contribution to
GDP growth is relatively large, while it contributes
under 3 percent to the growth in agricultural GDP.
This brings to light, again, the importance of produc-
tivity as a major source of growth in U.S. agriculture.
Productivity growth in U.S. agriculture not only sus-
tains the returns to factors engaged in U.S. agricul-
ture but also benefits the broader economy as effi-
ciency gains are passed on to consumers as lower
food prices through the food processing sector.
In the next section, we show that the rate of  produc-
tivity growth in U.S. agriculture is lower than that of
major European competitors.  However, it is relative
productivity growth (agriculture to nonagriculture)
that is relevant for agriculture’s export performance.
Using this measure, the United States has a clear
comparative advantage in agriculture.
How Does U.S. Agricultural Growth
Compare With That of European
Competitors?
Growth in European agricultural output has been rel-
atively high over the past few decades (fig. 6), and
coincident with the EU’s support for agriculture
(Arnade, 1997; Bureau et al., 1995; Ball et al., 1996).
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Table 4—Components of U.S. food processing
real GDP growth, 1959-91
Food proc. Real price       Input          TFP
GDP growth     effect      contribution   growth
Percent
1959-91
Average 1.04 -0.83 1.46 0.41
1959-63 0.95 -1.79 1.84 0.95
1964-68 1.61 -1.03 2.34 0.34
1969-73 3.52 1.54 1.46 0.53
1974-78 1.84 -0.51 2.64 -0.23
1979-83 -1.46 -2.27 -0.09 0.95
1984-88 0.78 -1.15 1.14 0.81
1989-91 -0.64 -0.94 0.59 -0.28
7 In an open economy like the United States, the downward pressures on
processed food prices are likely to forestall import competition from
other countries.Growth in productivity, particularly in the 1970’s, has
been higher in European agriculture than in U.S.
agriculture.  In the 1980’s, the gap between the rates
of productivity growth declined.8 There are two
hypotheses about growth in EU agriculture: (1)
growth has been stimulated by high and stable prices
that producers received under the European Union’s
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); and (2) agricul-
tural GDP growth in the EU has been the result of
technological change.  Our results suggest both fac-
tors played a part. 
We decompose growth in agricultural GDP for four
countries, Denmark, France, Germany, and the U.K.,
using the same growth accounting methodology
applied to the analysis of the United States.  Our
results (Gopinath et al., 1996) indicate that productiv-
ity is the primary source of growth in agricultural
output in these countries (fig. 7), as it was for the
United States.  Overall, the decline in real agricultur-
al prices in Denmark, France, and the U.K. was
smaller than that experienced by U.S. producers, and
thus, the negative price effects on their agricultural
sector’s GDP were less significant than for the U.S.
case.9 EU agricultural policies through about 1988
appear to have insulated its agriculture from the glob-
al decline in real prices.  Since 1988, the negative
effects of price declines on EU agriculture’s GDP
have been relatively large, but still smaller than those
for the United States (Gopinath et al., 1996).
Accompanying the  negative price effects is a fall in
EU agriculture’s rate of productivity growth.
Together, these two effects have substantially low-
ered the four countries’ growth in agricultural GDP,
particularly in recent years.
All else constant, the level of a country’s exports
depends not on absolute but on comparative produc-
tivity advantage.10 The  assessment of changes in
comparative advantage between two countries entails
a comparison of the ratio of growth in agriculture to
growth in the rest of the economy.  Productivity
growth is the dominant factor explaining output
growth in both U.S. and European agriculture. The
ratio of agricultural to nonagricultural productivity
growth in the United States was about 10 (2.17 per-
cent productivity growth in agriculture and 0.21 per-
8 USDA/Economic Research Service U.S. Agricultural Growth and Productivity
8 Our results on growth rates differ from that of Ball et al. (1996),
although the underlying patterns are similar.  We attribute the differences
to our methodology and data. We use the GDP function approach for
comparisons with the United States, while Ball et al. used a production
function approach.  Our data are derived from SPEL database by aggre-
gating over 32 crops and 20 inputs.  Ball et al. (1996) derived data from











Components of GDP growth in the United States
 and major EU countries, 1974-93













9 Although the EU has a common agricultural policy (CAP), it is not
necessary for CAP to have the same effect on all the economies.  As the
prices are relative to the other sectors of the economy, the price effects
can be different for countries within the EU.
10 Input-driven growth is inevitably limited because mere increases in
inputs must run into diminishing returns (Krugman, 1996).  Growth
through increases in efficiency/productivity is sustainable.cent productivity growth in the entire economy) dur-
ing 1974-91 (fig. 8).  For the European countries,
agricultural productivity growth ranged from about 7
percent for the U.K. to 2 percent for Germany.
Economywide productivity growth rates varied
between 1.7 percent for the U.K. to 2.9 percent for
France (Boskin and Lau, 1992).  This suggests that
the ratio of agricultural to nonagricultural productivi-
ty in major EU countries is between 1 and 4.  Based
on these comparisons, U.S. agriculture appears to
have a fundamental comparative advantage in world
markets relative to the EU largely because of its rela-
tive technological progress.11
Sources of Productivity Growth
Longrun increases in productivity growth can, for the
most part, be traced to increases in organizational and
technical knowledge (Krugman, 1996a,b).  While
resources are required to create organizational and
technical knowledge, it is commonly accepted that
markets for knowledge, even outside of agriculture,
tend to be imperfect because the returns realized by
an inventor fall far short of the invention’s full con-
tribution to productivity.  Knowledge is a nonrival
good in the sense that its use by one does not pre-
clude its use by another.  In addition, the partially
nonexcludable nature of knowledge poses difficulty
for its creators/owners in capturing the value of their
invention’s “total” contribution to future productivity.
This includes future inventors’ partial use of the
knowledge embodied in the given invention to invent
a new technology or process.  In other words, an
incremental increase in knowledge as reflected in a
new patent or a trade secret tends to generate new
ideas and additional patents.  These new ideas, which
are partially rooted in the initial patent, also provide
an incremental increase in new knowledge that not
only increases the productivity of firms within the
sector but throughout the economy.  Bernstein and
Nadiri (1988) and Gopinath and Roe (1997) suggest
such technological spillovers are relatively large for
the industrial and agricultural sectors in the United
States.  As the initial inventor is unlikely to receive
payments for these upstream inventions, the financial
incentives to allocate resources to R&D activity are
lower than those socially desired.12
Over 1949-9113, productivity growth in agriculture
can be attributed to four major factors: public invest-
ment in agricultural R&D, public expenditures on
infrastructure, private investment in R&D, and tech-
nological advances embodied in material inputs such
as fertilizers and chemicals (Gopinath and Roe,
1995a).  Public investment in R&D accounted for an
average of 50 percent of productivity growth in agri-
culture over 1949-91 (fig. 9).  However, public
investment in R&D affects TFP growth with a con-
siderable lag that averages 15 years.  Thus, the rela-
tively large contribution to growth in agriculture’s
TFP noted during the 1980’s is largely due to invest-
ments made in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  As we note
below, the rate of growth in public investment in
agricultural R&D has fallen significantly in recent
years.
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11 This is consistent with the results of Gehlhar and Vollrath (1996) on
U.S. export performance in agricultural markets.  The U.S. share of
world agricultural markets has grown by 1.3 percent per year beginning




















12 This condition is often referred to as market failure, where markets
fail to reward the innovator the full returns to his/her innovations.
13 This part of the analytical work was done with a longer time series.
Productivity growth comparisons within the U.S. economy and within the
EU were restricted to shorter time periods (1959-91 and 1974-91)
because of lack of data for earlier periods for the food processing sector
and the EU, respectively.The empirical link between public R&D and produc-
tivity growth is measured as changes in the cumula-
tive stock of public R&D, an index of the stock of
scientific knowledge.14 Similarly, an index of public
infrastructure measured by cumulating public invest-
ments in services—such as  highways, rural roads,
and public utilities—accounted for another 25 per-
cent of productivity growth in agriculture over 1949-
91.  Private R&D and the productivity embodied in
intermediate inputs together accounted for the
remaining 25 percent.
Public R&D has become an increasingly important
factor in agricultural TFP growth over time (fig. 9).
Infrastructure was more important in the early peri-
ods than the later periods, reflecting the large invest-
ments in interstate highways and other public utilities
during the 1950’s and 1960’s.  Private R&D makes a
consistent but smaller contribution to productivity
growth.15 This reflects the fact that most of the effi-
ciency gains from private investments in R&D are
paid for by farmers purchasing the intermediate fac-
tors that embody the technology.  Thus, the effects on
growth in primary agriculture’s real GDP caused by
private R&D investments are largely captured by our
measure of the level of intermediate input use.16
Public investment in agricultural R&D has been esti-
mated to have a high social rate of return.17
Nonetheless, the growth in public spending on R&D
has stagnated since the early 1970’s (fig. 10).  During
the 1980’s, research expenditures in developed coun-
tries grew at only one-quarter the rate experienced
during the 1960’s (Alston and Pardey, 1996, p. 47).
Studies of public investment in U.S. agriculture con-
clude that the social returns from these investments
range from 25 to 75 percent per year (Fuglie et al.,
1996).  Furthermore, private sector spending has
been found to be complementary to public sector
spending on agricultural R&D (Gopinath and Roe,
1995a).  The  development of the fundamentals of
new agricultural technology by the public sector pro-
vides private opportunities to refine and adapt these
technologies to particular environments and circum-
stances.  Thus, a decline in the growth rate of public
investment may also lead to a drop in private R&D.
Investment to enhance productivity growth (knowl-
edge creation) is sensitive to the structure of an
industry.  It is likely that underinvestment by private
firms occurs in technologies for which it is difficult
to exclude use by others.  For instance, U.S. seed
companies pursue new hybrid varieties of corn far
more intensively than high yielding varieties of
wheat because the excludability of hybrid corn
requires that farmers purchase the seeds (hybrid vari-
eties) every year.  Failure to exclude others from
using a technology, which is often the case with agri-
10 USDA/Economic Research Service U.S. Agricultural Growth and Productivity











Contributions to agricultural TFP growth, 1949-91
Percent per year
14 Following Huffman and Evenson (1993), this stock is measured by
cumulating public investments in R&D over a 30-year period.  However,
as investments vary in use over time, the annual investments were
weighted differently (perpetual inventory method).  For instance, an
investment in 1960 contributes little to the R&D stock for the first 10
years, contributes the most during the next 10 years, and then declines
toward zero by 1990 (trapezoidal density).  The presumption here is that
one dollar invested in agricultural R&D in 1960 is as productive as a dol-
lar of R&D invested in 1990.
15 It is often claimed that public R&D provides opportunities for the pri-
vate sector to further develop and adapt technologies to specific niche
markets. 
16 TFP, as measured here, is capturing sources of factor productivity
growth that are largely produced elsewhere, e.g., from public R&D, and
not from sources within the firm per se.  TFP growth in primary agricul-
ture may also induce efficiency gains in other sectors, for example, due
to  the production of a more homogeneous and higher  quality product
that lowers processing costs.  These additional gains are not accounted
for in our analysis.  Returns from investments that are internal to the firm
are captured as returns to the factors of that firm.
17 A full exposition of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.  See
Fuglie et al. (1996) and Alston and Pardey (1996) for more details.culture, is more likely in competitive industries pro-
ducing nearly homogeneous products.18
Thus, is there a high degree of externality to public
investments in agriculture so that the public and pri-
vate returns to the investment differ by a large mar-
gin?  In other words, do the public good properties of
agricultural technology create a divergence between
private and social benefits?  Given the large number
of relatively small firms and the significant overhead
involved in agricultural research, the potential returns
to a single entity are small compared with the poten-
tial for the industry.  The recent strengthening of leg-
islation to protect the intellectual property rights of
biological inventions has helped in the creation of
new technologies, but it is still not likely that the
benefits of new technologies will not benefit others
outside the inventing organization.  Evidence sug-
gests that private returns to R&D differ significantly
from the social rate of return, leading to under-
investment in private R&D  (Bernstein and Nadiri,
1988; Gopinath and Roe, 1997).
Since agricultural products are subject to both inelas-
tic demand and Engel’s law (declining share of
household expenditures as income increases), the
longrun beneficiaries of productivity growth are con-
sumers, who are able to purchase food and fiber at
ever-declining real prices.  Agricultural research has
high social benefits, but they are not easily captured
by the private sector.  On average, over 1959-91, pro-
ductivity growth in agriculture has largely been offset
by the decline in prices, leading to a net growth in
the sector’s real GDP of only 0.97 percent per year
(Gopinath and Roe, 1995a).19 Overall, societal bene-
fits have grown since the sector’s productivity gains
are coincidental with its declining real prices (fig. 3).
Industries that produce nonhomogeneous commodi-
ties, like food processing, are typically able to cap-
ture higher returns from private investments in R&D.
Firms in these sectors often produce a unique or dif-
ferentiated product for which they can extract
“excess rent” by charging a price above the marginal
costs of production.  The excess rent can be viewed
as a return to either the patent protecting the idea or
the trade secret embodied in the commodity.  Rents,
in this case, may be reinvested by the firm in R&D
activities that lead to developing a new, lower cost
cake mix or breakfast cereal.  Effectively, firms pro-
ducing differentiated products can, in principle, inter-
nalize the benefits of R&D to a greater degree than
firms producing homogeneous products.  Thus, the
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U.S. public agricultural R&D growth rates, 5-year moving average
Percent (in 1992 dollars)
1954 value represents average over 1950-54.
Source:  Alston and Pardey, 1996; and USDA.
18 For the same reasons, there is likely to be underinvestment in environ-
mentally sustainable technologies.
19 There are clearly other sectors which have experienced declining real
prices such as computers, other electronics, and communications, but pri-
vate investment rates in these sectors are relatively high.observed low rate of productivity growth in food pro-
cessing may result from the development of new
technologies, the cost of which we observe as invest-
ments appearing on the firm’s balance sheet.  In this
case, our growth accounting procedure (Gopinath and
Roe, 1995a) captures these effects on growth as input
effects.20
Conclusions
Growth in U.S. agricultural productivity benefits the
broader economy in three ways.  First, productivity
growth is the dominant factor explaining growth in
agricultural output in the United States.  TFP growth
has offset the negative effects of agriculture’s declin-
ing terms of trade and, thus, has sustained returns to
agricultural factors of production.  Lack of growth in
returns would almost surely have encouraged more
resources to exit agriculture, which, in turn, would
tend to lower growth in returns to family labor, farm
buildings, land, and other sector-specific resources.
Second, real agricultural prices have declined at 1.19
percent per year since 1959, which has been passed
on to consumers through the food processing sector.
Growth in the food processing sector arises largely
from its use of intermediate inputs.  The share of pri-
mary agricultural output in the intermediate inputs of
the food processing sector averaged 26 percent over
the last three decades.  The 1.2-percent fall in the real
prices of primary agricultural outputs led to a decline
of 0.32 percent per year, on average, in the procure-
ment cost of intermediate inputs.  This cost advan-
tage should allow the processed foods sector to com-
pete more effectively for export shares in the grow-
ing world markets for processed food.  However, real
prices of processed foods have also declined (-0.83
percent) more than the sector’s rate of productivity
growth (0.41 percent).  Thus, food processing passes
on almost all of its productivity growth and the gains
from primary agriculture to further downstream sec-
tors like food wholesale and retail industries, and
eventually to consumers.
Third, although the rate of European agricultural TFP
growth is larger than that in the United States, U.S.
agriculture has a higher relative productivity—the
ratio of agricultural TFP to nonagricultural TFP—
suggesting that it has the comparative advantage in
agriculture.  Hence, sustaining productivity growth in
U.S. agriculture is crucial for maintaining its share of
world agricultural markets.
Investments in public agricultural R&D and public
infrastructure accounted for 75 percent of the growth
in agricultural TFP.  However, although the rate of
TFP growth in agriculture has continued at above-
average rates since 1970, no further acceleration in
the series has occurred since the late 1960's.  Due to
the time lag between new investments in public agri-
cultural R&D and productivity growth, the current
slowdown in TFP growth may be explained, in part,
by the lower growth rate in public investments begin-
ning in the 1970’s.  More problematic is the implica-
tion of continuing stagnation of public investment in
agriculture on the future growth of the sector.
With declining real prices, growth in output and
returns to factors of production in agriculture depend
crucially on productivity growth.  Moreover, TFP
growth in primary agriculture helps maintain the
competitiveness of the food processing sector by
lowering its costs for primary agricultural commodi-
ties.  The decline in real prices of agricultural com-
modities and processed food products are passed on
to consumers.  Thus, the social rates of return to pub-
lic agricultural R&D, which leads to productivity
growth, are found to be relatively high.  This sug-
gests that positive growth of public agricultural R&D
investments should increase the living standards of
farm households and sustain the U.S. competitive
edge in foreign markets.  
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